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The Persistence of the Accruals Anomaly  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The accruals anomaly—the negative relationship between accounting accruals and 
subsequent stock returns—has been well documented in the academic and practitioner literatures 
for almost a decade. To the extent that this anomaly represents market inefficiency, one would 
expect sophisticated investors to learn about it and arbitrage the anomaly away. Yet, we show 
that the accruals anomaly still persists and its magnitude has not declined over time. While we 
find that institutional investors react promptly to accruals information, it is clear that their 
reaction is rather weak and is primarily characteristic of active investors who constitute a 
minority of institutions. The main reason: Extreme accruals firms have characteristics which are 
unattractive to most institutional investors. Individual investors are by and large unable to profit 
from trading on accruals information due to the high transaction and information costs associated 
with implementing a consistently profitable accruals strategy. Consequently, the accruals 
anomaly persists, and will probably endure.   
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The Persistence of the Accruals Anomaly 
1. Introduction 
Sloan’s (1996) pioneering documentation of the accruals anomaly—the negative 
association between accounting accruals (the non-cash component of earnings) and subsequent 
stock returns—spawned considerable research. Specific accruals that are mostly responsible for 
the anomaly (primarily inventories) were identified, and the relationships between the accruals 
anomaly and other documented phenomena, such as the post-earnings announcement drift, have 
been investigated. These studies were widely disseminated among researchers and in the 
investment community, and, not surprisingly, it has been shown that institutional investors do 
react to accruals information (Collins et al., 2003): These investors hold relatively large positions 
in low accruals companies, and low positions in high accruals companies. Given the relatively 
simple exploitation strategy of the accruals anomaly—acquiring long positions in low accruals 
companies and short positions in high accruals companies—one would expect that sophisticated 
and well endowed investors will cause the anomaly to quickly dissipate and ultimately vanish.   
Yet, this did not happen. We show below that the accruals anomaly persists to the 
present, and that its magnitude has not diminished over time. This suggests that investors’ 
response to accruals information is either untimely or insufficient to fully arbitrage the 
information in accruals about future price changes. If investors’ reaction is untimely, lagging the 
information disclosure, one would expect that the accruals anomaly will gradually decline and 
ultimately disappear as investors become more informed and efficient in trading on accruals 
information. In contrast, if the reaction is too timid, it probably indicates the existence of 
structural impediments to the implementation of profitable accruals strategies. To address these 
issues we conduct a comprehensive analysis of institutional reaction to accruals information, and 
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examine the possible impediments to a vigorous trading on accruals by institutions and 
individual investors.  
Collins et al. (2003) report that the annual change in institutional ownership is negatively 
related to the level of accruals in the previous year, which suggests that institutions react to the 
release of accruals information. However, the abnormal returns associated with accruals are 
mostly earned in the following year (e.g., Sloan, 1996), and start to accrue soon after the annual 
earnings announcement date (e.g., Collins and Hribar, 2000). Hence, it is not clear from the 
evidence provided by Collins et al. (2003) whether institutions react to the accruals information 
on a timely basis, or trade in extreme accrual firms following price changes.1 Indeed, Collins et 
al. (2003, page 275) state: “since we are using annual institutional holding data, results from this 
section should be interpreted cautiously,” and Bartov (2003), in his discussion of their study 
suggests examining quarterly rather than annual institutional data. We follow this suggestion and 
examine the timeliness of institutional reaction to accruals information using quarterly 
institutional ownership data.  
We find a negative relation between the level of accruals in a given year and the change 
in institutional ownership during the first quarter of the following year. That is, institutional 
investors react to accruals information during the quarter in which it is released. The change in 
institutional ownership in the second quarter of the subsequent year is also negatively and 
significantly related to prior year accruals, but its magnitude is smaller than that of the first 
quarter. The relationship between the change in institutional ownership in the third quarter and 
prior year accruals is insignificant. Thus, it appears that institutions trade rather promptly on the 
                                                 
1 Prior studies have documented both momentum investing and herding behavior by institutions (e.g., Grinblatt et 
al., 1995; Wermers, 1999), which could lead to an untimely and protracted response of institutions to accruals 
information. 
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accruals information, which suggests that the timing of institutional response is not likely to 
explain the persistence of the accruals anomaly.  
By elimination, therefore, we conjecture that the accruals anomaly persists because the 
response of institutions to accruals information is too weak to effectively move prices to intrinsic 
values. In support of this conjecture, we find that more than half of the total institutional 
response to accruals is made by “transient institutions,” those that trade frequently in an attempt 
to profit from short-term price changes. However, these investors account for only 20% of total 
institutional ownership of public companies. That is, most institutions appear to be only weakly 
active, or not active at all, in counteracting the accruals anomaly.  
We then ask: Why aren’t more institutions engaged in the seemingly profitable accruals 
strategy? We address this question by empirically identifying two profiles: that of firms with 
high/low accruals, and that of firms that institutional investors tend to invest in. Comparing these 
profiles, we find that extreme accruals firms have characteristics, such as small size and low 
stock price and book-to-market ratio, which institutions tend to avoid. The significant and 
systematic differences between the two profiles suggest that the weak response of institutions to 
accruals is at least partially explained by the unattractive characteristics of extreme accruals 
firms, which institutional investors avoid, due to prudent-person standards, liquidity concerns, 
and other considerations. 
If institutions are restrained in their response to the accruals potential gains, why don’t 
individual investors enter the fray and exploit the anomaly? We show that trading in the stocks of 
extreme accrual firms entails substantial transaction costs (broadly defined as commissions, bid-
ask spreads, margin requirements, and the price impact of trading), likely rendering such a 
strategy prohibitive for individuals. We demonstrate that in order to consistently generate gross 
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profits (before transaction and information costs) from an accruals strategy, the portfolios have to 
include a relatively large number of securities, which, due to the fixed per-transaction component 
of the costs, increase the burden of implementing the accruals strategy, particularly to 
individuals. We also show that most of the gains from an accruals strategy come from short sales 
of high accruals companies. These sales involve particularly large transaction costs. 
Consequently, individual investors are also constrained in implementing an accruals strategy.    
Our findings, therefore, suggest that the accruals anomaly is not likely to be effectively 
arbitraged by market forces. This, however, is subject to a caveat: We document that the 
response of institutions to accruals information exhibited a strong positive trend during our 
sample period, while the accruals anomaly has not diminished. It is possible that the positive 
effect on market efficiency of the increased institutional response to accruals was offset by the 
gradual deterioration in earnings quality during the sample period (e.g., Lev and Zarowin, 1999). 
Thus, to the extent that the positive trend in institutional response to accruals will continue, 
and/or earnings quality will improve, the magnitude of the accruals anomaly may decline in the 
future.  
Two related studies should be mentioned here. Bushee and Raedy (2003) examine the 
profitability of seven stock trading strategies, including the accruals anomaly. Specifically, they 
estimate the abnormal returns earned by the accruals strategy after deducting estimates of 
transaction costs, and report that the strategy generates positive abnormal returns. A unique 
feature of their study is the explicit consideration of several sources of transaction costs, 
including the price pressure of trading. Mashruwala et al. (2004) examine the consistency with 
which the accruals strategy yields positive abnormal returns, focusing on whether the volatility 
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of the returns can be diversified away. They document substantial residual volatility which, they 
argue, explains the continuation of the accruals anomaly.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 replicates the accruals 
anomaly and documents that its size did not diminish. Section 3 examines the timeliness and 
magnitude of institutional reaction to accruals information. Section 4 identifies the reasons for 
the weak response of institutions to accruals information, and Section 5 focuses on impediments 
to individual investors’ exploitation of the accruals anomaly. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. The Accruals Anomaly over Time  
 We start the analysis by replicating the accruals anomaly, and examining whether its 
magnitude has changed over time. To construct the sample, we merge the COMPUSTAT 
industrial, full coverage, and research files with the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) monthly files, and extract the accounting and market information required to measure 
accruals and abnormal returns (discussed below). Because the institutional holding data used in 
the primary analysis are available only for the end-of-calendar quarters, we restrict the sample to 
firm-year observations with December fiscal year-end.2 Our sample period spans the accruals 
years 1965-2002, and the stock returns range from May 1966 through December 2003 (as 
discussed below, stock returns are measured for the twelve months that start in May of the year 
following the accruals).3  
                                                 
 
2 This restriction guarantees that the same information on all firms is available for each of the analyses described 
below. 
 
3 For the accruals year 2002, we measure returns over an eight months period, from May 1, 2003, through December 
31, 2003.  
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Following previous studies, we use two measures of accruals: the change in successive 
balance sheet accounts (BS_ACC), and the difference between net income and reported cash 
from operations (CFS_ACC). The balance sheet-based measure of accruals is calculated as in 
Sloan (1996): 
 BS_ACC = (∆CA – ∆Cash) – (∆CL – ∆STD – ∆ITP) – Dep, (1) 
Where: 
∆CA = annual change in current assets (change in COMPUSTAT data item #4, i.e., ∆#4) 
∆Cash = change in cash and cash equivalents (∆#1) 
∆CL = change in current liabilities (∆#5) 
∆STD = change in debt included in current liabilities (∆#34) 
∆ITP = change in income taxes payable (∆#71) 
Dep = annual depreciation and amortization expense (#14).4 
The second measure of accruals, based on information from the cash flow statement, is 
calculated as: 
 CFS_ACC = EBXI – CFO, (2) 
where: 
EBXI = earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#123) 
CFO = net cash flow from operating activities (#308). 
Collins and Hribar (2002) report that the balance sheet approach to measuring accruals 
(expression 1) introduces measurement error into the accruals estimate, primarily due to mergers 
and acquisitions, and discontinued operations. The cash flow-based measure of accruals (2) is 
not affected by such corporate events, but is available only from 1988. We therefore use both 
                                                 
 
4 When data items #1, #34, or #71 are missing, we set their values to zero. 
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measures in our analyses. To account for size differences across the sample firms, we scale 
(divide) the accruals by the average of the beginning and end-of-year book value of total assets 
(#6).  
 We estimate abnormal (risk-adjusted) stock return as the difference between the firm’s 
one-year holding period return and the contemporaneous return on a matched portfolio based on 
size (five quintiles) and book-to-market (five quintiles for each size quintile). We measure 
returns from May of the year following the accruals to assure that investors had access to the 
accruals information we examine. For securities that delisted during the holding period, proceeds 
from the issue are invested in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ value-weighted index until the 
end of the holding period. All of our results are qualitatively similar when we use size-adjusted 
returns, or the residual return from a cross-sectional regression of the annual stock return on beta, 
size, book-to-market, and the prior year return (momentum), rather than the size and book-to-
market adjusted returns used in the primary analysis. We also obtain similar results when we use 
100 benchmark size and book-to-market portfolios (ten book-to-market portfolios for each size 
decile), instead of the twenty-five portfolios in the primary analysis.  
 To replicate the accruals anomaly and examine whether its magnitude has changed over 
time, we conduct the following analysis. For each year (1965-2002), we construct a zero-
investment portfolio that takes a long position in the stocks of firms in the lowest decile of 
accruals and an equal-size short position in the stocks of firms in the highest decile of accruals. 
We then calculate the mean abnormal portfolio return of this zero-investment portfolio in the 
subsequent year (beginning in May 1). Figure 1 presents the portfolio risk-adjusted returns in 
each of the sample years. Returns are reported for three portfolios: (1) NYSE&AMEX firms with 
extreme accruals, measured using the balance sheet approach (BS_ACC), (2) all firms with 
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extreme accruals, measured using the balance sheet approach, and (3) all firms with extreme 
accruals, measured by the cash flow approach (CFS_ACC). We run the analysis for 
NYSE&AMEX firms (first portfolio) to assure that the return patterns we identify are not due to 
the addition of NASDAQ firms during the 1970s. For the cash flow-based accruals, we report 
results using all firms only, because this measure is available since 1988 (i.e., after the 
introduction of NASDAQ firms).  
 Figure 1 indicates that for each of the three portfolios, the accruals strategy generated 
positive and economically significant abnormal returns in most years. Notably, the time-series of 
abnormal returns does not exhibit clear trends over time. To measure the size and significance of 
the portfolio abnormal returns and to test for temporal trends, we run the following time-series 
regression:     
 PORT_R = β1 + β2 TREND + ε, (3) 
where PORT_R is the portfolio annual abnormal return, and TREND = 0.001×(year – mean 
year). Note that since TREND has a zero mean, the intercept (β1) reflects the time-series mean of 
the portfolio abnormal return. Table 1 reports the regression (3) estimates for each of the three 
accruals measures and stock exchange samples described above. It is evident that the mean 
abnormal returns of the zero-investment portfolio (bottom pair of lines), as measured by the 
regression intercept, are positive and highly significant in each of the three columns, with the 
abnormal returns ranging between 7.5% and 8.9%.5 Consistent with the visual absence of 
patterns in Figure 1, the coefficient on the TREND variable is insignificant in each of the three 
regressions, indicating that the accruals anomaly still persists and its magnitude has not changed 
                                                 
 
5 These abnormal returns are slightly smaller than in Sloan (1996), due primarily to sample differences (e.g., our 
focus on December fiscal year-end firms) and the use of size/book-to-market adjusted returns instead of size-
adjusted returns. 
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significantly over time. Moreover, examination of the long and short accruals positions 
individually (low and high accruals, respectively), presented in the top two pairs of lines in Table 
1 indicates that there is no apparent trend in either side of the zero-investment strategy.   
We thus conclude that the accruals anomaly persists, and its magnitude has not abated 
over time. These finding are surprising given that institutional investors appear to be cognizant 
of and trade on accruals information (Collins et al., 2003), and that their share in the capital 
markets has steadily increased over the sample period (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). This 
suggests that the institutional response to accruals information is either untimely or relatively 
weak. We next explore these conjectures. 
 
3. The Reaction of Institutional Investors to Accruals Information  
 In this section we examine the reaction of institutional investors to accruals information, 
and in particular the timeliness of this reaction. Our research design involves regressing quarterly 
changes in institutional ownership on accruals and various control variables. The magnitudes, 
signs, and significance of the estimated accruals coefficients are used to determine the extent and 
timeliness of institutions’ reaction to accruals information, as well as patterns over time and 
across types of institutions in the reaction to accruals.  
Methodology 
To construct the sample for this analysis, we supplement the data extracted for the stock 
return analysis (Section 2) with additional accounting and market information from 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP (discussed below), and merge these data with institutional 13(f) 
common stock holding information derived from Thomson Financial Securities Data. Due to 
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limited availability of institutional ownership data, our sample period for this analysis covers the 
accruals years 1982 through 2001.  
The dependent variable in the institutional response regressions (Model 4, presented 
below), ∆IO(q,g), captures the change during quarter q in the percentage of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by institutions of type g. We report regressions for g including all 
institutions, as well as transient and non-transient institutions separately (defined below). We 
report regressions when q refers to the third and fourth quarters of the accruals year, as well as 
when q refers to the first, second, and third quarters of the subsequent year. We examine the 
change in institutional ownership in the last two quarters of the accruals year because some 
information about annual accruals can be predicted from the first three quarterly reports. 
However, we expect the strongest institutional reaction to take place in the first quarter of the 
subsequent year since most firms report annual earnings and accruals during that quarter. Some 
institutions may also trade on accruals information during the second quarter of the subsequent 
year, either because certain firms disclose complete accruals information after March 31, or due 
to delays in implementing a successful accruals strategy (e.g., obtaining the needed information 
on the level of accruals for benchmark firms, or investing gradually to reduce the price impact of 
trading). Such delays, however, are not likely to extend beyond the second quarter, if 
institutional reaction is timely. We therefore expect little or no institutional reaction in the third 
quarter of the subsequent year. 
Institutional investors differ in their intensity of trading on fundamental information, such 
as the accounting accruals examined here. Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors into 
three trading-intensity groups: institutions that buy securities and hold for the long haul, 
institutions that follow indexing strategies, and institutions that trade frequently in stocks 
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attempting to profit from short term price changes (“transient institutions”).6 To the extent that 
accruals proxy for earnings quality (persistence) and offer profit opportunities, transient 
institutions are most likely to trade quickly on accruals. We accordingly examine the response to 
accruals of transient and non-transient institutions separately, as well as the overall institutional 
reaction.7 Institutional ownership is measured as the fraction of the firm’s shares outstanding 
held by “large” institutional investors (institutions with more than $100 million of securities 
under discretionary management, which are subject to the 13(f) disclosure requirements).  
 The explanatory (independent) variable of focus in the institutional reaction regressions 
(4) is the size of the accruals component of earnings (scaled by average total assets). To examine 
changes over time in institutional response to accruals information, we use the balance sheet-
based measure of accruals (BS_ACC) described above, which is available for all sample years. 
For the more recent years (1988-2001), we report the sensitivity of the results when accruals are 
based on information from the cash flow statement (CFS_ACC). To allow for economic 
interpretation of the coefficient on accruals and to mitigate concerns with model specification 
issues (e.g., nonlinearity of the relationships, non-normality of the distribution of accruals), we 
replace the actual values of BS_ACC and CFS_ACC by their respective cross-sectional ranks, 
scaled by the number of cross-sectional observations.8  
                                                 
 
6 Bushee’s (1998) classification of institutional investors is based on their past investment patterns, as reflected in 
portfolio turnover, diversification, and momentum trading. 
 
7 We thank Brian Bushee for making his institutional classification data available to us. Classification data are 
available for the years 1981–1999 and are missing for a relatively few observations. For the years 2000 and 2001, 
we used the 1999 classification. The measurement error due to this procedure is likely to be small because the time-
series correlation in the classification scheme exceeds 80%. We obtained similar results to those reported when we 
excluded the years 2000 and 2001 from the analysis. 
 
8 Note that as a result of applying this procedure, BS_ACC and CFS_ACC range between zero and one, with values 
close to one (zero) for firm-year observations with the highest (lowest) accruals in that year. As discussed below, 
results are qualitatively similar when we use the actual values of accruals instead of the standardized ranks. 
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We next present the control variables in the regression of the change in institutional 
ownership on accruals (4). Various studies have demonstrated that institutional investors tend to 
hold a relatively sizeable investment in large firms (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Cready, 
1994; Hessel and Norman, 1992; Potter, 1992). This is attributed primarily to concerns of 
institutions with prudent-person standards (investment in large companies is generally 
considered safe), and to the preference of institutional investors for stocks with high levels of 
information and liquidity. We accordingly control for firm size (SIZE) in the regressions, 
measured by the logarithm of the market value of common equity at the end of the accruals year.  
We use three additional research-based proxies for the prudence of institutional 
investment and availability of information about companies: firm age (AGE)—the number of 
years since the start of coverage by CRSP, the  return on assets (ROA), and financial leverage 
(LEV). These controls were used in prior studies (e.g., Cready, 1994; Del Guercio, 1996; Bushee, 
2001). Return on assets (ROA) is measured as operating income divided by the yearly average of 
total assets, and serves as a proxy for the safety of investment (profitable firms are less likely to 
fail). ROA also controls for the information in accruals (BS_ACC) about the level of earnings 
(accruals are a component of earnings, along with cash flows). The variable LEV, a proxy for 
financial risk, is measured as the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the book value of 
debt and the market value of equity at the end of the year.  
Since institutions trade more frequently than individual investors and hold larger equity 
positions, they generally show an aversion to stocks with high transaction costs and low liquidity 
(e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). In addition to firm size, two commonly 
used proxies for transaction costs and liquidity are the price-per-share and share turnover (both 
variables are negatively related to transaction costs and positively related to liquidity). We use 
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these variables as controls and define LOGP as the log of the firm’s price-per-share at the end of 
the year. Turnover (TURN) is measured as the logarithm of the annual average ratio of monthly 
trading volume to total shares outstanding. 
Institutional investors tend to avoid shares with high idiosyncratic volatility (e.g., Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Bushee, 2001), yet were found to invest in high beta stocks (e.g., O’Brien and 
Bhushan, 1990) and follow momentum strategies (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 1995). We accordingly 
control in regression (4) for volatility (VOLAT), BETA, and ALPHA, where BETA (ALPHA) are 
the market model slope (intercept) and VOLAT is the residual standard error from the market 
model regression, which is estimated using all available daily returns during the accruals year 
and the value-weighted market index.9 We further control for the book-to-market ratio (BM), 
since many institutional investors follow either “value” or “growth” strategies, which induce a 
(positive or negative) correlation between institutional holdings and the book-to-market ratio 
(e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001). We also control for the dividend yield (YIELD), because 
institutional investors generally prefer stocks with low dividend yields and high capital gains 
(e.g., Cready 1994; Del Guercio 1996; Gompers and Metrick 2001).  
Finally, to mitigate potential bias due to omission of correlated variables, we control in 
the regression for the level of ownership by institutions at the end of the previous quarter (IO(q-
1,g)). In addition to capturing the effect of omitted variables, IO(q-1,g) may itself affect the 
subsequent change in institutional ownership, given that Bushee and Noe (2000) find that 
institutional ownership is mean reverting. 
                                                 
 
9 The market model is a time series regression of the stock’s return on the overall market return. The slope 
coefficient BETA, estimated from this model, is a widely used measure of systematic risk, and the intercept ALPHA 
indicates abnormal return. 
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The primary regression model which includes all of the control variables described 
above, along with our variable of interest—accounting accruals (BS_ACC)—is: 
 
 ∆IO(q,g) = αindustry + β BS_ACC + γ1 SIZE + γ2 AGE + γ3 ROA + γ4 LOGP  
 + γ5 TURN + γ6 BETA+ γ7 ALPHA + γ8 VOLAT + γ9 YIELD  
 + γ10 BM + γ11 LEV + γ12 IO(q-1,g) + ε, (4)
where αindustry represents an industry-specific (two-digit SIC) intercept, and all other variables are 
as defined above. To mitigate the effects of potential statistical problems (e.g., model instability 
over-time, heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation in the residual), we estimate regression 
(4) for each year (1982-2001) and report the time-series means and t-statistics of the estimated 
annual coefficients.  
Regression Estimates and Inferences 
Table 2 presents summary estimates form the cross-sectional regressions (4).10 Although 
all the control variables of Model (4) are included in the regressions, for parsimony we report 
only the accruals coefficients.11 Coefficient estimates are reported for the full sample period 
(1982-2001) as well as for the two subperiods 1982-1991 and 1992-2001. Focusing first on total 
institutional ownership (left two columns), the results for the full sample (first row in each panel) 
indicate that institutions do react to accruals information in the first quarter (Panel C) of the 
subsequent year, as well as in the second quarter (Panel D), and the reaction in the former is 
stronger than in the latter. In each of these quarters, the coefficient of BS_ACC is negative and 
                                                 
 
10 To mitigate the effect of influential observations, we delete in each analysis observations for which any of the 
variables in the regression lies outside the 0.5%–99.5% range of its sample distribution.  
 
11 Overall we find that the control variables have the expected signs consistent with prior studies. Table 4 below 
presents estimates from regressions of institutional ownership on the control variables.  
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significant indicating that institutions perceive the fragility of accruals: When accruals are high, a 
harbinger for future earnings and stock price disappointments, institutions decrease their 
holdings, and vice versa for low accruals. As we expected, the change in institutional ownership 
in the third quarter of the subsequent year (Panel E) is unrelated to accruals. Thus, it appears that 
institutions react to accruals rather expeditiously and complete their reaction within two-three 
months after the release of the accruals information. The estimates in Panel A and B, relating to 
institutional reaction in the last two quarters of the accrual year, suggest that institutions as a 
group do not react to the accruals information contained in the quarterly reports released during 
the accruals year. We will see below that transient institutions are cognizant of this information. 
Examination of the subperiod estimates in Table 2 suggests that the response of 
institutions to accruals information was much stronger during the recent period, 1992-2001, than 
in the prior ten years. In fact, institutional response to accruals information in the early sample 
years (1982-1991) is insignificant in all but the second quarter of the subsequent year, and even 
there the t-statistic is only –1.72. In contrast, for the recent period, 1992-2001, the accruals 
coefficient is statistically significant in both the first and second quarters of the subsequent year, 
and also marginally significant in the fourth quarter of the accruals year. These findings suggest 
that institutional investors have largely ignored accounting accruals in their investment decisions 
during the 1980s, but had clearly changed their attitude during the 1990s. The accruals 
coefficient in the 1990s is significant both economically and statistically. For example, the 
accruals coefficient for the first quarter regression (Panel C) is about 0.6, suggesting that firms 
reporting high (low) accruals experienced, on average, an abnormal decrease (increase) of about 
0.3 percentage points in institutional ownership during the first quarter subsequent to the accruals 
year.  
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As discussed above, institutions differ in their investment strategies and presumably in 
the likelihood of trading on accruals information. Accordingly, the estimates for total 
institutional ownership discussed so far may not indicate the extent to which active or transient 
institutions react to this information. Indeed, the estimates in the middle and right pairs of 
columns in Table 2 reveal that, for both subperiods, the reaction of transient institutions to 
accruals information was significant in the fourth quarter of the accruals year (Panel B), as well 
as in the first and second quarters of the subsequent year (Panels C and D). In contrast, 
nontransient (“other”) institutions appear to have traded on accruals information only during the 
1990s, and this trade was concentrated in the first quarter of the subsequent year. This suggests 
that the increase in overall institutional response to accruals information in the 1990s was due 
primarily to some nontransient institutions adopting active accruals strategies (or incorporating 
accruals information in other ways in making investment decisions).   
The differences in the estimated BS_ACC coefficients over time and across institution 
types in Panels A through E of Tables 2 could be due in part to long-term changes in the 
involvement of institutional investors in capital markets. Gompers and Metrick (2001) report that 
institutional investors have substantially increased their share in the stock market during the 
1980s and 1990s. This continuous increase in the relative magnitude of institutional trading may 
have contributed to the larger and more significant accruals coefficients in the 1990s observed in 
Table 2. To address this issue we report in Panel F of Table 2 the mean and standard deviation of 
ownership for each type of institutions during the two subperiods. Note that the mean of total 
institutional ownership during 1992-2001 is larger than that of the period 1982-1991 by a factor 
of 1.37 (32.16% compared to 23.55%), while the BS_ACC coefficient for the first quarter 
regression (Panel C) in the 1992-2001 period is larger than in the 1982-1991 period by a factor 
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of 6.23 (–0.586 compared to –0.094). It seems, therefore, that the positive trend in institutional 
involvement in capital markets played only a secondary role, if any, in the increased reaction of 
institutions to accruals information during the sample period. 
We suggest two non-mutually exclusive explanations for the increasing trend in the 
BS_ACC coefficient in Table 2 from the 1982-1991 to the 1992-2001 period. The first and 
obvious explanation is that institutions gradually learned about the accruals anomaly, as it was 
documented in the academic and practitioner literature (e.g., Sloan 1996). A second explanation 
is that institutions paid increasing attention to quality of earnings issues (e.g., earnings 
manipulation) in the 1990s—mostly involving accruals—given the SEC’s increasing attention to 
this issue and evidence that earnings quality has deteriorated gradually during the sample period 
(e.g., Lev and Zarowin, 1999).12 The fact that the accruals anomaly persisted throughout the 
sample period (Table 1) may be due to two countervailing forces: the positive trend in the 
institutional response to accruals information was offset by the negative trend in earnings quality, 
leaving the magnitude of the accruals anomaly unchanged.     
Finally, another interesting insight from Table 2 is that although transient institutions 
appear responsible for the majority of the institutional response to accruals information, their 
total investment is small relative to nontransient institutions (6.44% for transient institutions 
compared with 22.46% for non-transient institutions in Panel F of Table 2). That is, most 
institutions are only moderately active, or not active at all, in exploiting the accruals anomaly. 
This then raises the question: Why aren’t more institutions adopting the accruals strategy? We 
address this question in the next section. We conclude this section with two robustness checks. 
                                                 
 
12 During the 1990s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) significantly increased the pressure on public 
companies to curtail earnings management. As most earnings management instances do not involve cash, but rather 
a shift of accounting income from one period to another, they affect the level of accruals. It is highly likely that the 
SEC’s focus on earnings quality issues was noticed by institutional investors. 
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First, we reestimate Equation (4) measuring accruals by the cash flow approach, CFS_ACC (i.e., 
earnings minus cash from operations). The regression estimates with this measure of accruals are 
very similar to those reported in Tables 2 for the corresponding years (cash flow information is 
available since 1988 only). Second, we rerun the analysis using the actual ratio of accruals to 
average total assets instead of its cross-sectional rank. We find that the sign, significance, and 
time-series patterns of the accruals coefficients are all similar to those of Table 2.  
 
4. Why Don’t Institutional Investors Eliminate the Accruals Anomaly? 
The analysis in the previous section indicates that institutions react to accruals 
information on a timely basis, yet, the evidence reported in Section 2 clearly indicates that the 
accruals anomaly persisted throughout our sample period, and continues to the present. How can 
these findings be reconciled?13 A potential explanation is that the response of institutional 
investors to accruals information is constrained because firms with extreme accruals, which 
afford the largest benefits from an accruals strategy, have characteristics that institutional 
investors tend to avoid. For example, prior studies have documented that institutional investors 
are more likely to trade in the stock of large companies, which are less likely to have extreme 
accruals. As discussed in Section 3, there are additional firm characteristics which institutional 
investors prefer or avoid, and these characteristics may also be related to the likelihood of having 
extreme accruals. Accordingly, we conduct two complementary analyses to examine whether 
institutions shun away from extreme accruals firms. The first analysis examines the correlations 
of various firm characteristics with indicators of institutional activity, and with extreme accruals. 
                                                 
 
13 This puzzle is similar to that reported by Cohen et al. (2002), who examine the trading of institutions in response 
to earnings information and report that institutions do trade in the “right” direction but in a very conservative 
manner, which explains why institutional trading does not eliminate the earnings momentum anomaly. 
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If extreme accruals firms have characteristics that institutions tend to avoid, these correlations 
should have opposite signs. The second analysis extends the first by using multivariate 
regressions, and allows us to identify the characteristics that are incrementally related to accruals 
and institutional ownership, which are likely to explain institutional trading vis a vis accruals 
information.       
We use two measures of institutional activity in this analysis: (1) the level of institutional 
ownership at the end of the third quarter of the accruals year, and (2) the absolute value of the 
change in institutional ownership from the beginning of the fourth quarter of the accruals year 
through the end the second quarter of the subsequent year. We measure the level of institutional 
ownership at the end of the third quarter of the accruals year because our results in Table 2 
suggest that institutions start to react to accruals information from that point of time. We measure 
the change in institutional ownership from the beginning of the fourth quarter of the accruals 
year through the end of the second quarter of the subsequent year because institutions appear to 
trade on accruals information most intensely during that period. To capture extreme accruals, we 
use an indicator variable that equals one for firm-years in the bottom or top deciles of accruals, 
as well as an indicator variable that equals one for firms in the top accruals decile, and an 
indicator variable that equals one for firms in the bottom decile. 
Table 3 presents the time-series means and t-statistics of the cross-sectional correlations 
of the firm-characteristics discussed in Section 3 with: (1) the two measures of institutional 
activity (ownership and trading), and (2) the three measures of extreme accruals. We will 
comment on the correlations for institutional trading, namely the magnitude of ownership change 
(second column from left in Table 3), and those for extreme accruals in both the top and bottom 
deciles (third column from left in Table 3). As is evident from the statistical significance and 
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opposite signs of the correlation coefficients, institutions prefer to trade in the stock of large 
companies (SIZE), while extreme accruals are prevalent in small ones. In addition, extreme 
accruals firms are characterized by low profitability (ROA) and price-per-share (LOGP), while 
institutions prefer to trade in the stock of profitable firms having high share prices. Extreme 
accruals firms also exhibit high residual volatility (VOLAT), while institutions prefer low 
volatility.   
We next regress the two measures of institutional activity (level and change) and the 
three extreme accruals measures (five regressions) on the various firm-characteristics in Model 
(4), controlling for fixed industry effects. To mitigate econometric problems associated with 
using dichotomous dependent variables, we use the logit approach for the three extreme accruals 
regressions. Here too, we run the regressions for each year and report in Table 4 the time-series 
means and t-statistics of the cross-sectional coefficients. Consistent with the correlations in Table 
3, we note that institutions prefer to trade in the stock of large firms (SIZE) with a high price per 
share (LOGP), while extreme accruals firms are relatively small with low share prices. In 
contrast to the bivariate correlations in Table 3, profitability (ROA) is now insignificantly related 
to institutional trading, and the relation between extreme accruals and residual volatility is only 
marginally significant. However, the book-to-market ratio (BM) now emerges as differentiating 
between extreme accruals and institutional trading. It appears that institutions prefer to trade in 
the stocks of firms intensive in tangible assets, characterized by high book-to-market ratios, 
while extreme accruals are typical to intangibles-intensive firms (low BM ratio).  
The findings in Tables 3 and 4 thus suggest that the relatively weak response of 
institutions to accruals is at least partially due to the characteristics of extreme accruals firms. As 
institutions tend to avoid these characteristics (e.g., small size, low price-per-share and book-to-
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market ratio), the trading positions that they take in extreme accruals firms are not large enough 
to fully move prices to intrinsic values. Yet this mismatch between firm attributes preferred by 
institutions and those characterizing extreme accruals firms is unlikely to fully explain the 
persistence of the anomaly. We turn next to additional explanations. 
 
5. What about Individual Investors? 
Despite the substantial differences between the attributes of extreme accruals firms and 
those in which institutions tend to invest, it is doubtful that this phenomenon in and of itself is 
fully responsible for the persistence of the accruals anomaly. While institutions subject to 
prudent-person, liquidity, and other constraints may avoid extreme accruals firms, other 
institutions and particularly individual investors are not be subject to such institutional or 
contractual restrictions. In particular, given the relative simplicity of implementing the accruals 
strategy, one would expect individual investors to act upon it. We accordingly turn to consider 
another explanation for the persistence of the accruals anomaly—transaction costs (e.g., Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). We have shown above that firms with extreme accruals are relatively small 
with low share price and high return volatility. Such firms are generally associated with large 
transaction costs, consisting of commissions, margin requirements, bid-ask spread, and price 
impact of trading (pronounced in small, thinly traded companies). In particular, transaction costs, 
especially for individual investors, are a function of the number of securities in the portfolio. For 
a given size of investment, transaction costs increase with the number of securities involved, due 
to the fixed per-transaction cost component. We therefore examine the number of securities 
required to successfully implement an accruals investment strategy.  
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 Specifically, for increasing values of n (the number of securities in the portfolio), and for 
each sample year (1965 through 2002), we randomly select ½n securities from the low accruals 
decile and ½n securities from the high accruals decile. We then calculate the mean abnormal 
return in the following year of a zero-investment portfolio with equal-weights for the long (low 
accruals) and short (high accruals) portfolio positions. Next we calculate: (1) the t-statistic 
associated with the time-series mean of the portfolio abnormal return, and (2) the frequency of 
years (1965-2002) in which the portfolio abnormal return was positive. We repeat this process 
500 times, and calculate the mean values across the 500 replications of the t-statistic and 
frequency of positive returns. This simulation is aimed at determining the relationship between 
portfolio size and the consistency of gains from implementing the accruals strategy. 
Figure 2 plots the relationship between the mean t-statistic of abnormal returns and the 
number (n) of securities in the portfolio, and Figure 3 reports the relationship between the mean 
frequency of positive abnormal returns and the number of securities in the portfolio.14 The 
importance of relatively large portfolios in consistently generating gains from an accruals 
strategy is evident from both figures. Although the mean abnormal return across the 500 
replications is 8.9% for the various values of n, the statistical significance (in Figure 2) and 
frequency of positive returns (in Figure 3) are positively and strongly related to the number of 
securities in the portfolio. For an investor using the accruals strategy during the sample period, 
the portfolios had to include close to 40 securities in each year for the returns to be statistically 
significant (t-statistic ≥2.0). Even then, the strategy would have resulted in positive abnormal 
returns (before transaction costs) in only two-thirds of the years (Figure 3). In contrast, with ten 
securities in the portfolio, for example, abnormal returns were positive in less than 60% of the 
                                                 
 
14 Our measure of abnormal returns is the size/book-to-market adjusted returns described in Table 1. We obtain 
similar results when using each of the alternative approaches for measuring abnormal returns described in Section 2. 
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years, and were statistically insignificant. The relationship of the t-statistic and gain frequency 
with the number of securities is positive and concave for all values of n. Asymptotically, the t-
statistic converges to 4.826 and the gain frequency converges to 79%. Thus, from a starting point 
of 40 securities in the portfolio, substantial improvements in the consistency of gains (before 
transactions costs) can be obtained only through the addition of a large number of securities to 
the portfolio.  
Figures 2 and 3 thus demonstrate the substantial number of securities and the consequent 
transaction costs associated with implementing an accruals strategy. They also indicate that 
implementing an accruals strategy requires significant information costs, because one must 
collect information about the accruals of a relatively large number of firms. We accordingly 
conclude that transaction and information costs are important impediments to a widespread 
trading on accruals information, particularly by individual investors, thereby contributing to the 
persistence of the anomaly.   
 Augmenting significantly the transaction costs of an accruals strategy, for both 
institutions and individuals, are the costs of short sales. Table 1 demonstrates that the potential 
gains from an accruals strategy lie mostly with the “high accruals,” which require short sales.  
For example, for the NYSE & AMEX firms (left column of Table 1), the average annual gain 
from the short sales of high accruals is 5.4%, highly significant, while the gain from the low 
accruals is only 2.1%, and barely significant. Thus, over 70% of the total gain from the zero-
investment portfolio (long on low accruals and short on high accruals) come from the high end of 
accruals. Realization of this gain requires short sales whose transaction costs are very large, 
especially for individual investors. Ali and Trombley (2004, pp 8-11) outline the sources of these 
costs:  
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…the short seller first locates an existing owner of the security who is willing to 
lend the shares. The short seller leaves collateral of 102 percent of the borrowed 
shares’ market value and the collateral is adjusted daily on the basis of changes in 
market value.  The borrower also pays the lender a fee, which for cash collateral 
transactions is embedded in the rebate rate, interest paid by the lender to the short 
seller… cost of short selling for retail [individual] investors is greater than that of 
institutional investors, because retail investors typically receive no interest on 
their short-sale proceeds… Besides loan fee, another potentially important 
shorting cost is the risk that a short position will have to be involuntarily closed 
due to recall of the stock loan…about 2% of shorted stocks were recalled each 
month. 
 
Ali and Trombley quote estimates of the short sales loan fees, ranging between 0.20% to 4.72%. 
The high volume of short sales required for an accruals strategy probably renders it prohibitively 
costly for most individual investors. 
 Summarizing, the high costs of an accruals investment strategy due to the relatively large 
number of securities involved and the costs of short sales likely preclude most individual 
investors and even some institutions from implementing such a strategy.  
 
6. Summary 
We investigate in this study the persistence of the accruals anomaly, starting by 
documenting that the anomaly indeed endures to the present. We continue by exploring the 
reasons for the failure of institutions and individual investors to eliminate this market 
inefficiency. We find that institutions trade on accruals information on a timely basis, and 
document an increase over time in the intensity of this trade. Yet, the accruals anomaly persists 
despite the timely institutional response, implying that the reaction of institutions and other 
investors to accruals information is not strong enough to effectively move prices to intrinsic 
values. We suggest and provide corroborating evidence on the following explanations for the 
persistence of the accruals anomaly. First, extreme accruals firms have characteristics which are 
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undesirable to many institutional investors who face prudent-person, liquidity, and other 
constraints. Accordingly, these institutions play a limited role in counteracting the accruals 
anomaly. Second, implementing an accruals strategy involves high transaction costs due to the 
large number of securities involved and the intensity of short sales. These costs are especially 
onerous for individual investors. Given the relative permanence of the fundamental factors 
inhibiting an accruals strategy, it is likely that the accruals anomaly will endure for quite some 
time.  
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Table 1 
Time-series Regressions of Portfolio Abnormal Returns on an Intercept and Time Trend   
 
 PORT_AR = β1 + β2 TREND + ε  
 
 NYSE&AMEX firms, BS 
Approach (1965-2002) 
All firms, BS Approach 
(1965-2002) 
All Firms, CFS approach 
(1988-2002) 
 Intercept TREND Intercept TREND Intercept TREND 
Low accruals  0.021 -0.734 0.034 0.945 0.036 8.464 
 1.557 -0.588 1.869 0.562 1.050 1.079 
       
High accruals -0.054 -0.452 -0.054 -0.286 -0.053 5.221 
 -3.459 -0.317 -4.598 -0.266 -3.323 1.406 
       
Low – high 0.075 -0.282 0.089 1.231 0.089 3.243 
 4.445 -0.182 4.826 0.733 2.998 0.473 
 
For each regression, the first row reports the coefficients while the second row reports the t-statistics. PORT_AR is 
the mean abnormal stock return across the portfolio firms. Abnormal return is measured as the difference between 
the firm’s return and the contemporaneous return on a matched portfolio based on size (five quintiles) and book-to-
market (five quintiles for each size quintile). Returns are measured over a twelve months period starting in May of 
the following year. TREND is normalized to have zero mean, so the intercept measures the time series mean of the 
portfolio abnormal returns. The low (high) portfolio consists of equal-size positions in the ten percent of firms with 
the lowest (highest) accruals. Only firms with December fiscal year end are included. Two measures of accruals are 
used: based on changes in balance sheet accounts (BS), and using information from the cash flows statement (CFS).  
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Table 2 
Summary Estimates from Cross-sectional Regressions of the Change in Institutional 
Ownership (IO) on Accruals and Control Variables (Model 4) 
 
 ∆IO(q,g) = αindustry + β BS_ACC + γ1 SIZE + γ2 AGE + γ3 ROA + γ4 LOGP  
 + γ5 TURN + γ6 BETA+ γ7 ALPHA + γ8 VOLAT + γ9 YIELD  
 + γ10 BM + γ11 LEV + γ12 IO + ε  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is the change in IO during the third quarter of the year 
Total Inst. Transient Other 
Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(N) 
1982-2001 0.094 1.057 -0.039 -0.896 0.140 1.902 2,166 
1982-1991 -0.089 -0.880 -0.039 -0.584 -0.030 -0.311 1,627 
1992-2001 0.276 2.220 -0.038 -0.656 0.309 3.649 2,706 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is the change in IO during the fourth quarter of the year 
Total Inst. Transient Other 
Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(N) 
1982-2001 -0.098 -0.950 -0.200 -3.653 0.110 1.294 2,219 
1982-1991 0.021 0.131 -0.196 -2.384 0.203 1.357 1,655 
1992-2001 -0.217 -1.659 -0.204 -2.659 0.016 0.210 2,783 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable is the change in IO during the first quarter of the subsequent year 
Total Inst. Transient Other 
Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(N) 
1982-2001 -0.340 -3.040 -0.248 -4.307 -0.181 -1.542 2,066 
1982-1991 -0.094 -1.126 -0.229 -2.660 0.064 0.471 1,592 
1992-2001 -0.586 -3.254 -0.268 -3.308 -0.426 -2.640 2,541 
 
Panel D: Dependent variable is the change in IO during the second quarter of the subsequent year 
Total Inst. Transient Other 
Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(N) 
1982-2001 -0.259 -2.778 -0.263 -7.058 -0.035 -0.384 2,056 
1982-1991 -0.161 -1.723 -0.173 -3.039 -0.014 -0.131 1,585 
1992-2001 -0.358 -2.223 -0.353 -12.293 -0.057 -0.361 2,528 
 
Panel E: Dependent variable is the change in IO during the third quarter of the subsequent year 
Total Inst. Transient Other 
Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(β) t(β) Mean(N) 
1982-2001 -0.062 -0.667 -0.123 -2.134 0.008 0.154 2,044 
1982-1991 -0.094 -0.868 -0.127 -1.534 0.001 0.038 1,577 
1992-2001 -0.030 -0.193 -0.120 -1.406 0.014 0.146 2,511 
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Panel F: Institutional ownership at the end of the third quarter by group and over time 
Total Inst. Transient Other 
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. N 
1982-2001 28.90 23.92 6.44 7.83 22.46 19.08 40,629 
1982-1991 23.55 20.56 5.15 6.61 18.40 16.58 15,368 
1992-2001 32.16 25.21 7.23 8.39 24.93 20.06 25,261 
 
The regressions in Panels A through E include all the explanatory variables but, for parsimony, summary statistics 
(time series mean and t-statistic) are reported only for the accruals coefficient. The dependent variables, ∆IO(q,g), 
measure the change in ownership by institutional group g (g = all institutions, transient institutions, and other) 
during quarter q (q = third and fourth quarters of the accruals year and the first, second and third quarters of the 
subsequent year). Ownership is expressed in percentage points. SIZE is the logarithm of market value of equity at 
the end of the year. AGE is the number of years since the start of coverage period by CRSP. ROA is operating 
income divided by average total assets during the year. LOGP is the logarithm of price per share at the end of the 
year. TURN is the logarithm of the average ratio during the year of monthly trading volume to total shares 
outstanding. BETA (ALPHA) is the market model slope (intercept), estimated using all available daily returns during 
the year and the value-weighted market index. VOLAT is the residual standard error from the market model 
regression. YIELD is the dividend yield, measured as the total amount of dividends declared on common stock 
during the year divided by the market value of equity at the end of the year. BM is the ratio of book value to market 
value of common equity at the end of the year. LEV is the ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of 
capital (book value of debt plus market value of equity). IO is the level of institutional ownership at the beginning of 
the quarter. 
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Table 3 
Time-series Means and t-statistics of Cross-sectional Correlations of Firm-Characteristics 
with Measures of Institutional Activity and Extreme Accruals      
 
 Institutions Accruals 
 Holding Trading Extreme High Low 
SIZE 0.65 0.18 -0.23 -0.13 -0.18 
 116.56 14.91 -31.13 -26.04 -23.66 
AGE 0.33 -0.04 -0.18 -0.15 -0.09 
 16.95 -2.30 -24.82 -19.37 -15.88 
ROA 0.31 0.09 -0.14 0.03 -0.22 
 51.51 9.26 -11.97 3.69 -24.19 
LOGP 0.63 0.19 -0.23 -0.08 -0.23 
 143.29 21.65 -22.32 -10.40 -25.91 
TURN 0.22 0.24 0.10 0.12 0.01 
 10.13 19.43 8.86 10.02 0.99 
BETA 0.25 0.15 0.04 0.05 -0.01 
 9.80 16.01 3.03 4.77 -0.60 
ALPHA×100 -0.09 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.03 
 -3.92 7.17 0.87 4.38 -2.17 
VOLAT -0.48 -0.09 0.24 0.11 0.22 
 -43.18 -9.51 46.02 23.00 28.31 
YIELD 0.17 -0.03 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 
 11.91 -2.81 -20.27 -15.21 -18.76 
BM -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 
 -6.42 -8.75 -6.81 -9.34 0.88 
LEV -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 
 -1.35 -1.02 -8.05 -10.26 0.28 
 
For each variable, the first (second) row reports the time-series mean (t-statistic) of the cross-sectional correlation 
coefficient. The average number of observations per year is 2,059. The sample period is 1982-2001. “Holding” is the 
level of institutional ownership at the end of the third fiscal quarter. “Trading” is the absolute value of the change in 
institutional ownership during the nine months starting at the beginning of the fourth quarter. “Extreme” is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firm-years in the bottom or top deciles of accruals in that year. “High” is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firms in the top accruals decile. “Low” is an indicator variable that equals one 
for firms in the bottom decile. The other variables are described in Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics from Cross-sectional Regressions Examining the Firm-Characteristics 
Preferred by Institutions and Common for Extreme Accruals Firms      
 
 Y = α industry + γ1 SIZE + γ2 AGE + γ3 ROA + γ4 LOGP + γ5 TURN + γ6 BETA  
 + γ7 ALPHA + γ8 VOLAT + γ9 YIELD + γ10 BM + γ11 LEV + εt+1  
 
 Institutions (OLS) Accruals (Logit) 
Dep. variable: Holding Trading Extreme High Low 
SIZE 4.741 0.464 -0.230 -0.343 -0.114 
 28.812 5.644 -11.386 -14.289 -4.473 
AGE 0.099 -0.061 -0.015 -0.039 0.003 
 11.152 -7.370 -8.527 -8.668 0.944 
ROA 3.906 0.446 -0.249 2.020 -2.104 
 5.088 1.305 -2.008 6.712 -8.326 
LOGP 5.798 0.759 -0.097 0.079 -0.198 
 19.827 7.546 -2.678 2.255 -4.334 
TURN 4.973 2.272 0.267 0.325 0.013 
 7.742 8.970 6.839 5.163 0.319 
BETA -1.032 -0.014 0.130 0.176 0.079 
 -1.467 -0.101 4.870 3.117 1.501 
ALPHA×100 -8.983 2.071 -0.013 0.212 -0.239 
 -11.405 6.291 -0.182 1.840 -1.594 
VOLAT -26.012 -16.889 3.463 -6.005 8.020 
 -2.286 -3.137 1.896 -2.239 4.178 
YIELD -91.285 -15.209 -9.447 -17.808 -4.000 
 -7.667 -3.806 -7.400 -5.796 -2.420 
BM 4.110 0.395 -0.492 -0.747 -0.173 
 12.385 3.156 -10.940 -10.858 -4.431 
LEV 4.013 2.816 -0.163 -0.537 0.256 
 3.393 13.555 -1.457 -2.334 2.698 
Pseudo R2 0.557 0.152 0.163 0.095 0.083 
 
For each variable, the first (second) row reports the time-series mean (t-statistic) of the cross-sectional coefficients. 
The average number of observations per year is 2,059. The sample period is 1982-2001. “Holding” is the level of 
institutional ownership at the end of the third fiscal quarter. “Trading” is the absolute value of the change in 
institutional ownership during the nine months starting at the beginning of the fourth quarter. “Extreme” is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firm-years in the bottom or top deciles of accruals in that year. “High” is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firms in the top accruals decile. “Low” is an indicator variable that equals one 
for firms in the bottom decile. The other variables are described in Table 2.  
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Figure 1 
The Accruals Anomaly over Time 
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The figure reports the time series of abnormal zero-investment portfolio returns for three combinations of sample/accruals measure. Each portfolio consists of 
long positions in low accruals firms (lowest decile) and short positions in high accruals firms (highest decile). Abnormal return is measured as the difference 
between the firm’s return and the contemporaneous return on a matched portfolio based on size (five quintiles) and book-to-market (five quintiles for each size 
quintile). Returns are measured from May first through April 30 of the following year. 
BS_ACC (CFS_ACC) is a measure of accruals using information from the balance sheet (cash flow statement). 
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Figure 2 
Statistical Significance of a Profitable Accruals Strategy as a Function of Portfolio Size 
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This figure plots the mean (over 500 replications) of the t-statistic associated with the time-series mean of abnormal 
portfolio return during the period 1965-2002, as a function of the number of securities in the portfolio (n). The 
strategy takes equal-weight long positions in 0.5*n firms selected randomly from the low decile of accruals each 
year, and short positions in 0.5*n firms from the high accruals decile. Abnormal return is measured as the difference 
between the firm’s return and the contemporaneous return on a matched portfolio based on size (five quintiles) and 
book-to-market (five quintiles for each size quintile). Returns are measured from May first through April 30 of the 
following year. 
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Figure 3 
Probability of Positive Abnormal Return from Trading on Accruals Information as a 
Function of Portfolio Size 
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This figure plots the mean (over 500 replications) of the relative frequency of years during the period 1965-2002 in 
which the accruals strategy resulted in positive abnormal returns in the subsequent year, as a function of the number 
of securities in the portfolio (n). The strategy takes equal-weight long positions in 0.5*n firms selected randomly 
from the low decile of accruals each year, and short positions in 0.5*n firms from the high accruals decile. 
Abnormal return is measured as the difference between the firm’s return and the contemporaneous return on a 
matched portfolio based on size (five quintiles) and book-to-market (five quintiles for each size quintile). Returns 
are measured from May first through April 30 of the following year. 
 
